Monterey, Miami, and maximization: getting the most from your stars

How have two divergent clubs deployed their best attackers?

The most successful soccer teams are built around their best players. It’s an obvious statement, but that doesn’t make it easier to put into practice. In the 2023 USL Championship season, Monterey Bay FC and The Miami FC are evidence of the difficulties and rewards of maximizing your stars.

At the time of writing, Monterey is in the middle of a four-match winning streak, one that has moved them from second-to-last in the Western Conference back into the playoff field. Miami, meanwhile, has lost four of their last five matches and is increasingly adrift of their Eastern peers.

For Monterey, the difference comes down to Frank Yallop’s ability to tweak his tactics to roster specificities. Yallop, profiled excellently by Dan Vaughn at Protagonist last week, built a team with four attacking-minded wide players - Morey Doner, Alex Dixon, Chase Boone, and Sam Gleadle - at the core of his offense. How could he fit them into a single team sheet?

To do so, the gaffer adopted a 5-2-3 shape at midseason with Gleadle and Doner at wing back. Dixon and Boone, more natural at forward, sit higher in the attacking line.

Monterey had previously switched between back-four and back-five looks, and they’d rarely used Gleadle in defense, though he operated as a left back at prior stops like San Antonio FC. With the adjustments in place, Monterey’s season has been on a major upswing.

Above, you’ll see which of the last 10 matches each player started for Monterey. There’s an obvious trend : the NorCal side won every game in which heir stars shared the pitch. Monterey is winless otherwise.

What about Yallop’s use of the Big Four™ has been so effective? You can see it here.

In the first play, Dixon makes a run into the midfield to get a touch. This example comes from the Memphis match, a 1-0 win in which #14 started on the left wing. You’ll notice that Gleadle, the left wing back, makes a run up the sideline to counterbalance Dixon’s drop. From there, the opposition compresses in, allowing for a switch over the defense towards Doner on the overlap.

The second play starts similarly. #14 drops in for the touch as Gleadle comes up the flank, and Memphis is drawn to that flank. Behind them, Boone makes a burst into the box, a run perfectly timed to beat that high-stepping opposing line. Moments later, Boone draws a match-winning penalty.

Essentially, Monterey lets their wing backs move up into the attacking line, creating something like a 3-2-5 in possession. The numbers up top provide opportunities for interchange, leverage the crossing threat of Gleadle and Doner, and service the central scoring instincts of Boone and Dixon. Those abilities, so carefully accentuated, are driving this club into the postseason mix.

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By contrast, Miami has been a model of inflexibility. Even after Anthony Pulis was fired as manager earlier in the year, interim coach Lewis Neal has stuck with a 4-2-3-1 or 4-4-1-1 shape predicated on an off-balance orientation.

There’s admittedly a bit to like about that approach. Keeping Aedan Stanley deep at left back and allowing Mark Segbers to bomb forward from right back is a smart choice; Segbers becomes the fulcrum of the offense. Against more solid foes, the 4-4-1-1 can also give Miami a trio of players to clog the midfield depending on the No. 10.

However, if you’re making a comparison with Monterey, the issue becomes apparent: Miami’s back-four formation doesn’t maximize their most consistent creators.

Here, I’m focusing on Ryan Telfer, Christian Sorto, and Joaquin Rivas in addition to Segbers. Two of the four, Telfer and Rivas, are regulars for their national teams, and that greatly affects things. Indeed, there are no easy answers for Miami and the USL at large when balancing international absences with the talent that those sorts of players bring to the table.

Even so, Miami has been spotty about employing them as a group even with the full set available.

Amidst that four-wins-in-five run in mid-August, Miami rose to a near-50% chance of making the playoffs in a crowded East. They’re at 18% now amidst a dry run of form, and Neal has shown no signs of changing things up in the manner of Monterey.

Frustratingly, there are a few obvious ways in which to fit the Telfer-Sorto-Rivas-Segbers group together. Going full Yallop is one route: Telfer has played wing back at times, so he can slot in on the left with Segbers on the right. That leaves the other two attackers free to slide up top.

The usual 4-2-3-1 is equally viable, as well, and that’s how all four got involved in August. You see how they flow together in the clip.

Here, Segbers is hugging the right sideline and forcing the defense deeper by virtue of his presence. In making that run, the right back opens a pocket for a teammate to receive the ball and turn upfield. Miami comfortably enters the attacking zone in a 3-2-5 look, where four of the front five are Telfer, Sorto, Rivas, and Segbers.

Because of the mass threat, the guests are drawn up, and the striker makes a run against the heightened defense to get a shot in a one-on-one situation. It’s tactical identical to what Monterey does in the final third, pushing up into a front five with four creators around the hub of a proper No. 9. We don’t see enough of it.

What alternatives have been preferred? Often, Florian Valot will sit in as the No. 10 in the 4-2-3-1 or 4-4-1-1, but he prefers to play as a deeper sort of creator rather than a roving second striker. Without those runs, Miami isn’t forming that crucial “front five” that so stresses a defense. This isn’t to diss Valot, who’s a wonderful player. However, Miami has Gabriel Cabral as that style of midfielder in the pivot already, making a No. 10 surplus to requirements.

A true 4-4-2 shape is another arrow in the Miami quiver. In that look, Neal prefers to use two physical strikers - think Kyle Murphy and Claudio Repetto - who aren’t as wry or mobile. Murphy is an interesting case study here. He’s been in and out of the squad despite boasting three double-digit scoring seasons in the last four years. Maybe the shape works if you commit to Murphy, but that hasn’t happened.

You can see the difference in utilization in the numbers as well. I would argue that Miami’s group is more skillful than Monterey’s on a man-for-man basis, though both are very good. The data paints the opposite picture; the Californians have generated more goals (16 to 13) and more assists (13 to 6).

Moreover, the distribution of shots and key passes is much more balanced in Monterey. Yallop’s 5-2-3 creates balance and forces opponents to address threats in every area of the pitch. Miami’s less-balanced, rightward-leaning look simply doesn’t test defenses in the same manner, even with Segbers putting up another all-USL season.

The lesson here is one of flexibility. Being able to adjust a philosophy is a must in the USL, especially for clubs on the bubble. Monterey doesn’t have the budget of the glitziest teams in the league, but they have a few bonafide stars, and Frank Yallop’s tweaks make them shine. Miami can’t say the same despite a much larger budget, and they’re likely to miss the playoffs because of it.